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Decentralisation in Kosovo: challenges of reforming the local level 
 
Ilire Agimi* 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Studies of external democracy assistance and the promotion of good governance have tended 
to focus primarily on the transformation of central government institutions and the interaction 
between state and non-state actors at this level. Although local institutions, organisations and 
contexts are not ignored as such, the emergence of multi-level governance is implicitly 
predicted to occur at a later stage, once reforms have been established at the core. As this 
paper demonstrates, local governance reform arguably constitutes a much greater challenge. 
In its assessment of new modes of governance in Kosovo, this paper adopts a local perspective 
to examine the trajectory of reform and investigate whether, and the extent to which a shift is 
occurring towards multi-level governance. It is argued that in a post-conflict environment, a 
shift towards a less-hierarchical mode of governance at the local level is the critical measure of 
substantive reform and wider participation in local governance and donor interventions at 
local level. Drawing on primary research into the effectiveness of externally-led projects 
designed to open up decision-making processes and strengthen relations between state and 
non-state actors, the paper maps actor involvement in local government reform and identifies 
the various constraints on this critical dimension of democracy promotion. The study 
concludes that contextual challenges including institutional legacy and ethnic division as well 
as internal flaws of external initiatives diminish the impact on driving change at the local level. 
                                                 
*
 Maastricht University; contact ilire.agimi@maastrichtuniversity.nl; This paper was first presented at the 
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Introduction 
 
Despite the enormous resources invested by international agencies in reforming local governance in 
Kosovo, the latter shows no signs of significant improvement towards efficient services, inclusive 
decision-making processes and functioning intergovernmental relations. For the last 13 years, the 
international community has invested a vast amount of resources in Kosovo to establish and support 
its institutions, with the European Union devoting the largest per capita donations in its history of 
external engagement in democracy promotion. Yet, despite the resources being invested in the 
country, local government reform has shown limited success. Strengthening state structures, 
developing a new political culture and opening up the decision-making process continues to be a 
daunting practice for all international agencies involved in the country. After series of reform policies, 
this raises the question to what extent a shift towards multilevel governance has occurred at the local 
level, if at all? What types of obstacles limit international initiatives in exerting a transformative 
impact on the ground and are they a matter of substance or rather contextual factors? This study will 
address all these questions by taking a ‘local perspective’ and looking at evidence from two concrete 
case studies at the local level. 
Taking a local governance lens helps us identify drivers of reforms and understand the challenges of 
instigating change and opening up the decision-making process where it matters the most, closest to 
citizen. It provides a snapshot of the broader governance picture and allows us to look at drivers of 
change. Local administration, public services, local elections, public discussions and representation in 
local assemblies are crucial for citizen to rebuild relations with the state. In order for the state to 
legitimize itself and re-establish a link with citizen, reforms must be implemented at the local level to 
facilitate a return of state authority. During the statebuilding phase, when domestic sovereignty is 
still challenged, on ethnic or political grounds, or simply on lack of capacity to serve the public, the 
state risks losing its power to regulate and enable a functioning multilevel governance. In addition 
communication with non-state actors survives through informal channels rather than established 
governance structures and mechanisms of coordination and decision-making. These conditions 
weaken the central government’s role in regulating, guiding and incentivizing local stakeholders to 
advance local governance. 
Considering these significant statehood limitations to ensure services and advance socio-economic 
conditions, the international community is able to exert more power and cast its own ‘shadow of 
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hierarchy’ (Börzel, 2010) substituting for weak central government. Whilst policy influence on choices 
of decentralization is exerted through working with central government institutions, another 
straightforward path for external agencies is to establish partnerships at the ground level. In working 
directly with local authorities, external agencies get ‘the easy way’ and possibly reinforce centralized 
mechanisms of decision-making within local government structures thereby strengthening the power 
of local elites. Confident on donor projects supporting their status; political elites utilize the status 
quo and the term ‘local ownership’ takes on a dangerous connotation contrary to its conventional 
use. This type of concentration of economic and political power, and significant disconnection from 
the weak central government facilitates local capture of power. 
Following Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence, despite the powerful backing of decentralisation 
policies by the international community, local governance remains weak. The central government 
dependency on financial and technical assistance of international agencies diminished its power and 
authority to drive change towards new governance at the local level. Local administrations are weak, 
dependent on central government financing and often confused over the ever changing legal 
framework and its impact on their responsibilities and competencies. The difficult challenge remains 
to reconfigure the state’s role at all levels of governing and to establish improved links between the 
centre and local levels as well as between citizen and state institutions. 
The first section of the paper brings together literature on local governance and statebuilding setting 
out key elements and analysing their relevance to post-conflict societies. The second section focuses 
on key dimensions of local governance in Kosovo and lays out the trajectory of reform in the last 
decade. A separate subsection gives particular attention to the North of Kosovo and the failure of 
local government reforms in this politically contentious area. This is followed by an outline of the 
variety of institutions involved in promoting decentralisation, which provides a clear picture of the 
complexities on the ground. The last section presents two case studies of external initiatives by the 
biggest donors involved in local government reform. Semi-structured interviews with donor agencies 
and representatives of the international community in Kosovo (including UN Mission in Kosovo, OSCE 
and International Civilian Office) provide insight on the trajectory of reform in Kosovo and their role 
in pushing forward certain strategies for decentralisation. Finally, some policy recommendations for 
establishing wider local participation and ownership over donor interventions at local level are 
presented. 
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Building local governance in a post-conflict context 
In a post-conflict environment, agencies involved in promoting reform, assign normative values to 
their strategies. Concepts such as democratic governance are enshrined within the broad objectives 
of governance reform, inevitably shaping a certain understanding of the policy. Actors involved 
annotate positive or negative attributes to the concept of governance altering its neutral nature. 
Hence, good governance principles become part of the policy narratives and discourses of 
international agencies. International agencies and their democracy promotion programs tent to lean 
towards these normative Western conceptualisations assuming ‘the modern Western nation-state is 
the model for ‘good governance’’ (Risse, 2012). In recent years however, more scholars caution on 
the limitations of a loose (good) governance model, considering that the governance discourse is 
based on developed, democratic and modern nation-states. Governance must be explored in the 
context of developing and transition states as well, where there are areas of limited statehood (Risse 
& Lehmkuhl, 2006). In fully functioning states, the government, or the general state apparatus has 
the ability to enforce political decisions and thereby conduct hierarchical steering. Yet most 
developing and transition states contain territorial or policy ‘areas’ in which the state authority is 
limited or state political or administrative capacities are deficient in providing services (Risse 2012). In 
these areas of limited statehood, values and objectives of international initiatives are difficult to 
translate on the ground where ‘other’ modes of governance persist. The domestic conditions, 
primarily weak state capacities, permit a substitution of institutionalised modes of coordination, 
decision-making and service provision by externally offered models of governance  (Risse 2012; Börzel 
and Risse 2010). 
In a post-conflict environment, as institutional structures and modes of coordination between various 
actors are (re)established or (re)designed, the significance of each institution and layer of authority 
becomes extremely important. During this process, the role of the local is paramount to opening up 
processes of decision-making and service provision and establishing ‘new’ modes of governance. In 
order to secure a shift from local government to local governance, the latter must be integrated into 
a broader network of multilevel governance thereby requiring further shifts of change in hierarchical 
coordination between layers of institutions. It is vital to recognize that this shift does not diminish the 
role of the state. Thus, promotion of new governance, local or national, is inconceivable without a 
clear role of government (Börzel 2010). The notion ‘bringing the state back in’ (Evans, Rueschemeyer, 
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& Skocpol, 1985) can be applied to the local level as local authorities may strengthen their position 
through multi-level governance and regulated interactions with other state and non-state actors. As 
Charles Tilly writes, “no democracy can work if the state lacks the capacity to supervise democratic 
decision-making and put its results into practice” (Tilly 2007, 15). 
Local government reform policies often include decentralisation or some form of devolution of power 
from the central level to the local governments. Decentralisation can provide varying degrees of 
services and benefits appropriate for and based on local constituent preferences (Hooghe & Marks, 
2003). Securing local self-government serves also as a mechanism for accommodating ethnic group 
rights and facilitating inclusion of minority communities in the decision-making process. Establishing 
central government institutions, which are legitimate in the eyes of the citizen, is a crucial factor in 
statebuilding yet democratic local governance within the reach of the population, is also of great 
relevance in post conflict reconstruction (Hohe, 2002). Self-governing and decentralized structures 
are critical to restore the presence of the state, to ensure stability, demilitarize politics in divided 
societies and increase interethnic cooperation (Lister and Wilder 2005). Local government is the first 
body of public authority the citizen turns to for solving their immediate social problems. It is ‘the level 
of democracy in which the citizen has the most effective opportunity to actively and directly 
participate in decisions made for all the society’ (Sisk 2001, 15). 
Literature on public choice and political economy addresses a common presumption that the lower 
the level of government, the greater is the extent of capture by vested interests (Bardhan & 
Mookherjee, 2000). In a post-conflict statebuilding context the challenge of this setting is the limited 
state apparatus resources and legitimacy, thus serious deficiency in its sovereignty to control and 
exercise its authority in implementing political decisions (Risse & Lehmkuhl, 2006).  Other scholars 
assert that whilst donors remain influential in setting the agenda mainly ‘by virtue of their money’ 
(Hyden, 2007), when it comes to implementation, domestic agencies dominate and are able to alter 
the course of policies depending on their political interests. An array of statebuilding literature 
concurs to state authorities remaining key partners for the international community considering the 
former’s potential to push forward or halt reforms (Bliesemann de Guevara, 2010; Chesterman, 2004; 
Hohe, 2002; Sisk, 2007; Tansey, 2009). Other studies seem to tolerate, to the point of legitimizing 
reforms that may augment bureaucratic capacities separate from state institutions. This may occur as 
a side effect of avoiding to create resilient state structures, which may abuse of political power at the 
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local level. This ‘hollowing out’ view of the state enables an unsustainable model of governance in 
which the role of the state is, at best, not clearly defined and at worst ignored.  
Supporting local governance by opening up local decision-making to non-state actors in fact improves 
the capacity of the state to exercise its sovereignty. Studies of municipal performance in South East 
Europe confirm that municipal efficacy grows with the increasing involvement of social and economic 
actors in the policy-making process (Petrova, 2011). A critical assumption found in this literature is 
that of an existing trickle-down effect by which concentrated efforts at strengthening central 
government institutions will eventually strengthen local structures (Manning, 2003). 
Dominant theoretical and empirical studies on Kosovo’s statebuilding process place insufficient 
emphasis on the imperative of sorting out local government politics (Narten, 2008; Narten & 
Zuercher, 2009; Tansey, 2009). Within statebuilding literature, a limited group of studies address the 
local level developments from different perspectives. Scholars have looked at service delivery and its 
contribution to building democratic institutions (Jackson & Scott, 2007; Van de Walle & Scott, 2009) 
and power sharing arrangements and ethnic representation mechanisms of managing ethnically 
divided societies (Bieber, 2004, 2010; Monteux, 2006; Woodward, 2002). Only recently has 
comparative analysis of post-conflict countries drawn attention to the local level, as in Carrie 
Manning’s study of local challenges in implementing peace agreements during the 1990s and the 
need for broad inclusion of stakeholders throughout government tiers when negotiating sustainable 
political arrangements (Manning, 2003). Other studies by Paula Pickering (2007, 2010) bring attention 
to the impact of local government reforms on communities and highlight citizen evaluations of these 
reforms. The case of Kosovo is especially intriguing considering its limited statehood and the 
extensive involvement of international donors in attempts to enable a shift towards multi-level 
governance.  
 
Local governance in Kosovo 
Local government in Kosovo remains underdeveloped, weak and dysfunctional. Own source revenues 
are low and local administrations fail to deliver all services required by law. Kosovo is a prime 
example of the complex political environment and its impact on the policies for reform. High 
involvement of international agencies and rapid changes in the political arena allow for a vibrant 
picture of a variety of actors, interests and negotiations. Conflicting messages regarding local 
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government reform occurred during the first post-war decade as the political environment remained 
volatile. Kosovo’s political status determined when reforms got on the political agenda and how 
decentralisation was addressed. Recent political shifts, including the Declaration of Independence 
and the constitutional backing of broad decentralisation and minority protection have brought about 
increased attention to the local level. 
Formal structures of local administration in Kosovo are inherited from the Socialist Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia where local authorities exercised formal municipal functions as an extended arm of 
national government control (Ebel and Péteri 2007). Institutional legacy has been continuously 
identified by both domestic and international agencies as a challenge in state administration. 
Centralized hierarchy and weak civic engagement with authorities prevailed for many decades, later 
inhibiting reestablishment of citizen-state links after 1999. Sub-municipal units called local 
communities (bashkesia lokale/mesna zajednica), a semi-formal scheme of organization, may have 
largely influenced a distant relationship with the state.1 The decades long culture of parallel 
institutions, ‘a rejuvenation of a Kosovar tradition of local governance and self-management’ 
(Kostovicova 2005), further contributed to local governance functioning outside of central state 
hierarchy and guidance. 
Following the set up of broad international presence in Kosovo in 1999, local government has been 
subject to a range of reform strategies over the years with several overlapping and others even 
contradicting each other. The selection and refinement of a local government model has been often 
unfathomable and abrupt, as the process of reforms is not based on a blueprint of an existing 
Western model (Ebel and Péteri 2007). The UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) abolished former Yugoslav 
structures and re-established municipal authorities with a European-based legal framework. Yet, 
concrete steps to decentralise authority, including fiscal decentralisation, transfer of public property 
and reform of public services did not materialize (Hajnal & Péteri, 2010). Despite initial de jure 
devolution of rights to local authorities, several competences were recentralized soon after by the 
UNMIK administration. 
A significant factor in developments of local politics was the establishment of local provisional 
institutions through the appointment of the strongest political parties in a non-legitimate process. 
This occurred until the first elections took place. Choosing local ‘partners’ was under the discretion of 
                                                 
1 This structure operated under the legal framework of the Federation until the abolition of Kosovo’s autonomy 
in 1989 
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international staff (Interview OSCE 2011). Confusion over municipal competences and clashes over 
political and economic power between old and new elites contributed to a charged political 
environment at the local level and damaged accountability.2 The election boycott of the Serbian 
community further diminished the potential of the central government to implement local 
government reforms (UNSC 2004, par. 39).3 Regulations on local competences and intergovernmental 
relations changed frequently making an exploration of the legislation and policies a challenge. Local 
government reform, addressed in 2003/2004 with the Standards for Kosovo policy, aimed to 
introduce local governments to benchmarks of good governance through measures of democratic 
institutions, rule of law, local development and integration of minorities. The following Framework 
for the Reform of Local Self-Government in 2005 did not result in diminishing the disparity between 
central and local interests and local governments were largely evaluated to fail in achieving standards 
of good governance. The Framework was the closest to a domestically owned process as any of the 
reform policies in Kosovo as it had a broad range of actors in the drafting process. Yet, it had no 
significant impact in strengthening the role of local authorities by entrusting more political power or 
fiscal authority in managing local affairs as decisions continued to be made at the central level.  
One of the principal advancements towards democratic local governance was Regulation No. 2007/27 
On Municipal Elections enabling the direct election of Mayors in municipalities. This enabled 
measures to strengthen accountability at the local level and breach the embedded political 
allegiances of political parties who controlled local institutions. Whilst the introduction of direct 
election of Mayors was unanimously welcomed, local leaders perceived the parallel introduction of a 
unified municipal structure through the new set of policies as a breach of municipal autonomy in 
decision-making. Annex III on Decentralisation, of the Ahtisaari Comprehensive Status Proposal 
ensured a ‘final’ push for political, administrative and fiscal decentralisation. The significance of the 
new legal framework adopted in 2008 and the elements of power devolution were undermined by 
the political clashes between Albanians and Serbs and became more apparent to municipalities only 
recently as municipalities began to fully operationalise their aspirations of more competences. 
Additional municipal competences include a slightly higher autonomy in using municipal budgets, 
collection of taxes and enhanced rights for inter-municipal cooperation. Nevertheless, fiscal 
decentralisation is yet to be adopted in practice as municipalities continue to be deprived of full 
                                                 
2
 Turnout in local elections dropped from 79 % in 2000 to 53.9% in the 2002 elections. 
3
 Challenges posed by the refusal of Serbian community to participate in Kosovo’s local institutions are a 
separate component of the broader research project and are beyond the scope of this study. 
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financial support for enhanced competences they obtained through decentralisation. Weak collection 
of taxes has maintained a strong motive for central government to withhold releasing full fiscal 
authority to local decision-makers. 
 
The ‘Northern’ Issue 
One of the dominant issues challenging decentralisation reforms concerns the ethnic factor in Kosovo 
which ‘tainted’ any attempts to promote a solely administrative understanding of the reforms. 
Municipalities north of the Ibër/Ibar river remain out of reach for Kosovo legal and security 
authorities and refused to participate in the initial UNMIK reforms of 2002, the Pilot Municipal Units 
policy of 2005 and the subsequent Ahtisaari proposal for highly decentralised units for Serb majority 
municipalities. North Kosovo suffers from a lack of rule of law with violent repercussions against 
international or Kosovo led initiatives to impose rule and order in that part. Kosovo Serbs living south 
of Ibër/Ibar river in Mitrovica, are scattered in different municipalities and have surpassed the big 
ethnic divide in recent years. The Serbian community4 and the Serb political parties, under significant 
pressure from Belgrade, in the North have so far resisted integrating with Kosovo institutions. 
Although funds flowing from Serbia to Kosovo parallel structures have decreased significantly after 
the international financial crisis of 2008, the Serbian government funds healthcare, education 
services in a number of Serb majority areas (Hajnal & Péteri, 2010; OSCE, 2008). After Kosovo’s 
declaration of independence in 2008, the Serbian government doubled its efforts to influence the 
Serbian community in Kosovo allocating 500 million EUR to parallel structures in Kosovo. After 
Serbia’s 2008 parliamentary and local elections, Kosovo Serb leaders in the North began setting up 
their own local institutions, including a parliament. Serbia committed about 42 million Euros for 
parallel structures in Kosovo a day after submitting the application for EU Membership in December 
2009 (KIPRED 2009). 
Throughout the 10 years of its legal control, UNMIK influence over the Serbian community was 
marginal especially in the North. The initial reform policies aiming at including Serb citizen in new 
municipalities disappointed. As subsequent decentralisation efforts were undertaken throughout 
Kosovo, regardless if successful or not, the Serbian dominated municipalities remained isolated from 
these attempts. Serbs boycotted Kosovo elections and resigned from government functions although 
                                                 
4
 Contrary to common perception, the majority of Kosovo Serbs live outside the three municipalities in north of 
Kosovo where around 30 % of the mainly Serbian community lives. 
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some returned to cooperate with Prishtina later. Political developments in 2010 brought about a 
“Strategy for the North of Kosovo” by the International Civilian Office in Kosovo aimed at opening a 
Kosovo government office in an ethnically mixed neighbourhood in the north, the closure of the 
UNMIK presence in the north, and many other initiatives with the goal of integrating the north and 
marginalizing Serbian parallel institutions (Woehrel 2010).5 Serbia and local Serb leaders strongly 
rejected the plan which lacked broad international support from EU headquarters and the 
International Steering Group (KIPRED 2012). Kosovo institutions held local elections in November and 
December 2009, including most of the Serbian majority municipalities foreseen in the Ahtisaari plan. 
In some areas south of the Ibar river, significant numbers of Kosovo Serbs participated. 
Considering all the aforementioned issues, establishment of new municipalities proved challenging 
for the Kosovo Ministry of Local Government Administration (MLGA) and ICO. The MLGA met with 
Serbian community members to assess their readiness for participation in the Municipal Preparation 
Teams and help establish new municipal structures with very little success. South of the Ibar River, 
MLGA and ICO succeeded in getting cooperation from local Serbs and by 2010 established initial 
structures of new municipalities as prescribed by the Ahtisaari proposal and the new Law on Local 
Self-Government. The appointment of municipal leadership in these municipalities led to a total of 5 
Kosovo mayors belonging to the Serb community. The 2009 local elections saw a greater participation 
from the Serb community which elected their own mayors or approved coalitions established 
between Kosovo Serb political parties and Albanian ones. Kosovo-Serbs are represented with 33 seats 
in five municipalities. Kosovo Serb political party Independent Liberal Party (SLS) has eight seats in 
Shtërpcë/Štrpce municipality, 12 in Graqanica/Gračanica and 10 in Kllokot and also two ministers in 
Kosovo’s government  (one serving as Deputy Prime Minister for Communities). The Serbian Party of 
Kosova and Metohija (SKMS) and Serbian Democratic Party of Kosova and Metohija (SDSKiM) each 
have one seat in the Graqanica/Gračanica municipal assembly and the Serbian Citizen Association 
won the local elections in Ranillug (IKS 2011, 69).6 
                                                 
5
 The European Union quickly distanced itself from the strategy, despite the fact that the ICO representative is 
also EU Special Representative in Kosovo. 
6
 This research was completed before the local elections held in November 2013 with the Serb community in 
four Northern munciipalities participating for the first time since the Declaration of Independence.  
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The institutions behind decentralisation 
International agencies in Kosovo engage in promoting decentralisation in a flexible and unsystematic 
manner. They focused more on ‘the manageability and efficient control’ rather than real 
empowerment of local government units (Hajnal & Péteri, 2010). There are considerable political 
payoffs to undertaking governance reforms with stakeholders oriented towards ‘tangible benefits in 
the short term’ (Grindle 2004, 18). Initiatives focusing on ‘improved garbage collection and security in 
public markets are high visibility changes that can build citizen trust that government services are 
getting better’ (2004, 18). Nevertheless, the international agencies have approached activities of 
assisting socio-economic development and institutional capacity building through a central 
government spotlight; pressing for local government issues mostly for political stability reasons (EC 
2005). Using the core executive as a source of government, for a decade many initiatives 
concentrated at the central level. 
Within the international community where a ‘European’ and ‘American’ approach is not openly 
declared, different approaches with several distinctions may still be drawn out. Both European and 
American agencies funding local governance initiatives entail democratic principles at the core 
foundations of their understanding of governance. Utilizing it as a further qualification of the term, 
‘local governance is linked to democratic values such as rule of law, separation of powers, 
representation, checks and balances and respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms’ 
(Binder, Slits, Stoquart, Mullen, & Schubert, 2008). In addition, USAID defines democratic local 
governance as ‘inclusive governing’ emphasizing democratic interactions between community 
members and local authorities. The EU, on the other side, with a strong focus on development, 
defines local governance as follows: 
…a process of decision making on matters of local/municipal development and the 
implementation and management of development plans and the provision of basic services 
through allocation of available resources in order to achieve agreed development goals and 
targets (Binder et al., 2008). 
In external democracy promotion, the European Commission approach to local government reform 
and decentralisation varies from place to place corresponding to different levels of experience and 
evolution, in addition to the willingness and commitment of countries to decentralize (Binder et al., 
2008). European Commission documents focus on local governance building on the principle that 
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local matters are a responsibility of local councils or stakeholders at the local level. On the other 
hand, USAID documents on local governance emphasize improved local conditions for governing and 
for citizen satisfaction. They define local governance as ‘more effective governing, increased trust in 
government, improved services, more robust local economic development, and greater involvement 
of citizens in civic affairs. The existence of the European Charter on Local Self-Government is another 
distinction with the ‘American’ approach as it is commonly used by European Commission projects as 
a guideline. 
In the Western Balkans realm, the EU strategy in member statebuilding is clearly recognisable 
considering the promotion of European models and values of local governance including the concept 
of regionalisation discussed later on the paper. The European Office in Kosovo in particular, focuses 
on acquis related issues and considering that ‘decentralisation is not related to acquis, the European 
Union office does not take an official stance on it’ (EUOK interview 2012). The EU strategy is to work 
with streams separating work and establishing partnerships directly with municipalities in addition to 
collaboration with central government ministries. At the central level, the focus is on ‘changing 
policies which are hindering better services and implementation of good practices’ (EUOK interview 
2012). In addition to being critical of USAID for steering away from general decentralisation political 
processes by concentrating on small technical areas such as waste and water management, EU 
officials face a general ‘passivity’ of domestic stakeholders stating: 
…when it comes to EU, local and central governments will accept anything but EUOK does not 
know what is best for Kosovo. There is a lack of a strong counterpart for our work with 
regards to guiding donors and their funds where the government needs them most (EUOK 
interview 2012). 
In the annual European Commission (EC) Progress Reports on Kosovo, local governance does not 
receive much deliberation and is mentioned superfluously, despite the exhaustive nature of the 
reports after Declaration of Independence in 2008. The main challenges identified on local 
governance include weak local administrations and lack of cooperation between local and central 
level institutions, limited inclusion of minority communities, Serb parallel structures obstructing 
decentralisation and civil service vulnerable to political interference, corrupt practices and nepotism. 
Capacities to exercise local competencies and involve civil society organizations in decision-making 
remain obstacles after 2008. EC reports are critical of the government for lacking a strategic approach 
for interaction with civil society (European Commission 2008). To help identify its targeting of local 
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governance, the table below presents a detailed look into EU financial assistance. As can be observed, 
local government reform and decentralisation appear as crosscutting issues instead of a major policy 
focus. The data shows an increase in financial assistance after the declaration of Independence in 
2008 to its highest amount since 2003. Allocation of € 14 million to local infrastructure shows support 
for the establishment of new municipalities and implementation of the new decentralisation 
framework. 
 
Table 1. European Commission financial assistance (numbers in € million) 
 
Source: Author from EC Annual Programmes and Multi-Annual Programming Documents (MIPDs). 
 
Another international agency working parallel with central and local governments is the OSCE Mission 
in Kosovo. For a decade, its Local Governance Programme provided training and capacity building for 
local authorities and facilitated cooperation with civil society organizations (Baskin 2004). The OSCE 
remains a hub of information concerning local governance yet its presence on the ground as well as 
engagement to continue reforms has decreased since 2008. 
                                                 
7
 Assistance to the Association of Kosovo Municipalities reappears frequently as a channel for supporting local 
governance structures and strengthening the representation of local interests through this unified mechanism. 
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Notes7 
2003 49 - 5 - 1 1 Funds under LG designated for AKM 
2004 75.4 15 7 -  1 - 
2005 54 19. 6 11 6 - 1 PA funds include support for AKM 
2006 - - 8 - - 0.5 PA funds include strengthening of LG 
2007 68.3 - 5 - 12.4  LG funds incl. 4.4 for institution building & 8 for infrastructure 
2008 184.7 - 4 6.60 14 2.5 LG funds for municipal infrastructure 
2009 106.1 - - 7.8 6.5 4 LG funds for strengthening institutional capacity 
2010 67.3 2 5.5 - - - EC assistance significantly decreases. 
2011 68.7 65.83 20.35 - - - PA funds for 3 years 
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On the domestic institutional front, the establishment of a Ministry for Local Government 
Administration (MLGA) in late 2004, after two local elections already took place, demonstrates the 
bleak vision of central government in guiding local governance. Unfortunately, its existence did not 
prove significantly valuable to reforms. Since its establishment, the MLGA has acted as an 
administrative hub for the implementation of local governance reform policies. Rather than initiating 
reform policies itself, most strategies were drafted in accordance with international donor initiatives 
providing assistance. Despite its self-perceived role as a leader in strengthening local institutional 
capacities (Maxhuni, Ukimeraj, Vasolli, Ujkani, & Osmani, 2009), weak capacity of central government 
to supervise local authorities, as well as ‘contrasting interpretations of legislation on self-
government’, often block cooperation between central and local authorities (European Commission 
2010, 8). The MLGA potential to strengthen intergovernmental relations was not fully utilized and 
especially damaged through the exclusion of municipalities in the drafting process of new legislation. 
The formal monthly meetings of the Minister with all Mayors have not improved relations between 
municipalities and central government. 
A key institution, which provides an ideal platform for communication for municipal administrations, 
is the Association of Kosovo Municipalities (AKM). Despite its long existence and broad membership, 
AKM was often marred by criticism of municipal delegates and international partners arguing that its 
lack of interest in advocating for local interests has weakened its role and made it a superficial actor 
(ICO interview 2011). The AKM has considerable potential to advocate for the interests of 
municipalities as well as acquire central government attention to issues pertaining to local 
governance yet this potential is not fully utilized. 
 
Case studies 
To critically assess the effectiveness of externally-led projects designed to strengthen local 
governance by opening up decision-making process and strengthen relations between state and non-
state acts, two case studies are examined below. Utilizing primary research data, the analysis 
provides an in-depth look at the initiatives of EU and USAID analyzing their objectives, trajectory of 
implementation, relations with central and local actors and identifying various constraints to their 
effectiveness. Factors addressed below include integral flaws of international initiatives as well as the 
contextual complexities inhibiting change towards new modes of governance at the local level. The 
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cases illustrate the limits of international engagement in promoting bridges between state and non-
state actors from a bottom-up perspective. 
Both the EU and the USAID projects identified local governance as a fundamental part of their 
strategies of supporting Kosovo socio-political transformations after the Declaration of 
Independence. Their mandates stress the importance of the local level in strengthening democratic 
institutions and ensuring links between government authorities and citizen. Whilst the USAID projects 
builds on previous work at the local level, the EU funded project is new. New mechanisms of 
coordination and decision-making are thus formalized through secondary legislation or formal 
decrees of municipal Mayors. On the other hand, intergovernmental linkages between central 
government institutions and local administrations are not given adequate attention. Considering the 
weak central state, this further reinforces the gap between government tiers, ignoring the 
significance of central government authority for ‘pushing’ a local government tier into effective 
governance. 
EU Regional Economic Development – EURED 
The European Commission project for Regional Economic Development (EURED), a € 12.4 mil 
initiative, aims at promoting a new approach to development by supporting regional cooperation of 
municipalities and preparing Kosovo institutions for absorption of future EU regional development 
funds. Although regions are not a constitutional entity in Kosovo,8 the EURED approach to local 
governance is entirely dependent on it’s regional focus. EURED established Regional Development 
Agencies (RDAs) across five regions to instigate and coordinate economic cooperation between 
municipalities and private agencies and provide support for the local counterparts as they prepare 
funding applications. In a rather unconventional understanding of ‘local ownership’, EURED officials 
asses that the idea of establishing RDAs generated as a top-down approach, however, as priorities 
were revised, local actors ‘turned it into a bottom-up approach’ (Interview 2011). This important 
component of the initiative is thus a result of external ideas produced in Prishtina and elsewhere. The 
RDAs, promoted as inter-municipal institutions, are in fact registered in the host municipality as Non-
Governmental Organizations. The status of NGOs for these agencies is a controversial factor 
considering that signatory authority of signing Inter-Municipal Cooperation Agreements is the 
                                                 
8
 Under Yugoslavia, Kosovo had 29 municipalities throughout five recognized regions: Prishtina/Pristina; 
Peja/Peć; Gjilan/Gnjilane; Zubin Potok/Žubin Potok; Novo Bërda/Novo Brdo and Shtërpca/Štrpce. 
18 
 
 
respective Mayor. Furthermore, mayors of participating municipalities in each region also serve as 
Board Members of the respective RDAs. This key aspect of EURED is at the same time its most 
perplexing point. The regional structures are temporary due to the lack of legal backing for regional 
operations. Cooperation is thus based on inter-municipal agreements signed between each of the 
municipalities to stimulate economic growth and develop capacities to absorb future international 
funds including EU pre-accession (IPA) funds (EURED 2010). 
The aforementioned gaps do not completely undermine the novelties of the project. First, the focus 
on development is notable. The lack of a national strategy on development, at the time of EURED 
initiation, signifies Kosovo’s dire policy environment for which EURED attention to development 
policies is particularly beneficial. Through the additional Socio-Economic Audit Forum, local 
stakeholders drafted the Regional Economic Development Strategy and Implementation Plans. RDA’s 
statement “It was 8 months of work for what usually takes 3 years” emphasises the approach centred 
on ‘getting things done’ (RDA South interview, July 2011). Second, the initiative contributes in 
promoting new mechanisms of decision-making, which cross state/non-state boundaries. In terms of 
advancing new modes of governance, the most important structures established are i) the Regional 
Economic Development (RED) platform encouraging local stakeholders to work together with other 
municipalities in their region, and ii) the Core Partnership Group which assembles representatives of 
all municipalities to develop strategic objectives for economic development in their region. 
Participants include the local authorities, business associations, civil society organizations working on 
development and universities and as such present a positive mechanism of contact and collaboration 
between diverse sectors. This broad inclusion of actors is beneficial to the local environment as it 
strengthens communication between local government institutions and non-state representatives. In 
addition, inter-municipal cooperation is enhanced when local organizations, businesses and local 
governments jointly produce strategies for developing their respective municipalities. A common 
vision, in this case promoted under the umbrella of regions, is beneficial provided that it enables 
shared responsibility and commitment to achieve common benefits. Finally, the EURED grant scheme, 
which awards proposals developed by regional groups for economic development, enables a cyclical 
process benefiting participants. Municipalities have shown great enthusiasm in participating in the 
project considering it a funding opportunity. Furthermore, this process of cooperation allows pooling 
of resources and enables a win-win situation for participating municipalities who ‘recognize the 
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power of applying as a region as compared to an individual unit’ (RDA South interview 2011). EURED 
advisors consider this as “a free ticket to development” (Interview 2011). 
The inter-ethnic environment is another aspect in which EURED mechanisms of cooperation may 
influence the local level. Municipalities with non-Albanian majorities such as Zubin Potok and 
Mamusha have shown exceptional performance in participating in regional forums. Challenges 
remain with the boycott of other Kosovo Serbian-majority municipalities especially in the Partnership 
Group, where other ethnic group delegates have participates. The EURED approach fails to achieve 
any success in this regard as they declare: “We do not have time to wait for anybody in this open 
process!” (RDA South interview 2011).  
In the political economy realm, the institutional legacy of a centralized regime combined with the 
current weak state constrain the work of local institutions. The changing nature of discussion and 
‘sharing the spot-light’ with other stakeholders may constitute a threat to the political leadership 
whilst benefiting other actors. This process has cast a more passive role for municipal authorities, a 
role some Mayors are struggling to accept (EURED advisor interview, July 2011). Mayors of host 
municipalities, where RDA offices are located, tend to assume a stronger role in their regions. This 
shows a clear tendency for local government authorities to resist accepting a stronger role for non-
state actors. 
At the central level, the partnership with the Department for Regional Development and European 
Integration within MLGA, does not contribute to advancing EURED objectives, as the Department is 
not directly responsible for advancing the development dimension. One particular sign of embedding 
the EURED framework within Kosovo institutional structures has been the renaming of the former 
Department for European Integration into the Department for Regional Development and European 
Integration. The Ministry of Economic Development and the Ministry of Trade and Industry provide 
for stronger links between central institutions, RDAs and municipalities. At the local level, the leading 
partners remain the local authorities whose consent and participation is essential for the 
establishment of RDAs in the first place. Furthermore, prioritisation of business organisations over 
other non-state actors, overshadowed stronger empowerment of civil society organisations. 
A major shortcoming of the project remains the issue of regions, namely aspiring to strengthen 
structures without backup from national level policies. Internal project deficiencies, including lack of 
strategies to integrate existing structures to overall development policies, establishment of new 
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administrative layers for RDAs and lack of strategies to overcome challenges are apparent in the 
EURED case. The future of their already established structures and mechanism, including the RDAs, 
remained unclear as the project terminated in early 2012. The case study illustrates EU readiness to 
implement and invest on any venture under the broad aim of strengthening new modes of decision-
making. 9 
On the other side, all platforms established to facilitate meetings and communication between actors 
aid municipal authorities to share the ‘spotlight’ with other actors including the non-state sector. 
Acquiring the expertise and acknowledging the interests of other parties involved contribute to 
opening up centralized mechanisms of decision-making commonly used in municipal administrations. 
The collaborative work in designing economic development strategies for their regions strengthens 
capacities of both local authorities and non-state organizations participating. Grants acquired by ECLO 
in awards for high quality projects rewards this type of collaborative work strengthening municipal 
commitment for the future. Furthermore, local authorities and actors from the private sector attain 
opportunities for inter-municipal cooperation, which is recognized and legally regulated. 
USAID Democratic Effective Municipalities Initiative - DEMI 
The second case study covers a USAID initiative working towards strengthening local governance. 
USAID involvement in local governance projects has been consistent since early 2000s and its support 
for local reforms was particularly strong partly out of frustration with efforts to reform central 
government institutions (Carothers, 1999). The Agency’s current engagement boasts work in 
regularizing mechanisms for incorporating citizen input and civil society organisations into local 
decision-making and government oversight (USAID Kosovo 2010). 
The Democratic Effective Municipalities Initiative (DEMI) provides technical and financial assistance 
for execution of municipal responsibilities. Project officials acknowledge that ‘Kosovo has passed the 
trainings and workshops phase’ thus focusing on guidance of local stakeholders (DEMI interview, July 
2011). However, despite this official focus on mentoring ongoing processes of reform, a fundamental 
part of the project’s support for local governance is the establishment of two mechanisms to steer 
local decision-making processes into an open and inclusive direction. First, the High Performing 
                                                 
9
 To integrate the currently administrative functions of RDAs into the larger development strategy, the Ministry 
of Trade engaged in discussions with European Commission only in 2012 and refused to serve as main 
counterpart during EURED at initiation of project in 2009. 
21 
 
 
Organization model promotes best practices within Kosovo and replicates them in another 
municipality. Its main objective is structuring existing municipal functions into novel organizational 
arrangements and inciting new ways of thinking about municipal service. DEMI objectives include 
assisting local administrations in setting priorities for priorities for service outcomes, engage citizens 
constructively in that process, and enhance abilities to identify needed improvements to their 
municipality’s systems, processes and human capacity. In order to address citizen participation, DEMI 
focuses on utilizing existing tools, which proves especially beneficial to the local circumstances. 
Frequent changes in local administration structures disturb institutional history and cause confusion 
among local officials concerning competences and lines of authority.  
The Service Improvement Action Plan (SIAP), another model introduced by DEMI, facilitates plans for 
improving public services by including municipal administration together with businesses as well as 
civil society organizations. Formally established by the municipality Mayor, the project focuses its 
work in assisting the Committee for Policies and Finances as the most important organ within the 
municipal administration and with dire need for advice considering ‘their scarce knowledge in how to 
involve citizen in the decision-making process’ (DEMI interview 2011). The Novobërdë/Novo Brdo 
municipality is a particular instance of increased citizen engagement and awareness concerning 
municipal policies. DEMI facilitated a Memorandum of Understanding enabling cooperation between 
the municipal Mayor and the NGO Youth Voice leading to youth activists conducting a survey 
amongst municipal residents concerning the municipal budgeting process and priorities of the 
municipality. Survey results, presented to the Mayor, showed low participation in budget hearings, 
low satisfaction with the work of municipal officials and figures of less than half of those interviewed 
which were informed about the budgeting process. For the local leadership ‘this is the first time that 
municipality of Novobërdë/Novo Brdo has conducted a survey to consult citizens on budget planning 
process as well as the first time to outsource an NGO to increase citizens participation in budgeting 
process (DEMI 2011). These results are an example of new mechanisms being internalized into 
municipal administration practices. These cases however prove to be dependent on municipal leaders 
who are ‘more autonomous because of their power over what they can execute’ (DEMI Interview, 
July 2011). In practice however, most municipalities have not enabled these mechanisms.  
Similar to the previous case study, a grants scheme is a fundamental part of the DEMI project. The 
grants scheme is a continuation of the previous USAID project EMI. Currently, DEMI awards 
municipalities for high performance and achieving set benchmarks for efficient public services. This 
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has secured municipal participation in the program and municipalities actively engage in improving 
their services and designing innovative ideas for new projects. The grant scheme incentivizes 
municipalities to compete with each other and submit applications for each round of grants for 
improved performance. This promotion of the model of competition amongst municipalities has 
proven successful fulfilling a key objective of USAID to encourage market based reforms. Yet, 
domestic financial support for this model is scarce. The MLGA has declared to sustain this model of 
incentives and rewards for municipalities in the future when USAID funds terminate. This is a rather 
difficult task considering the weak role of the Ministry portfolio in the government. 
The institutional legacy within municipal administrations is another challenge for promoting new 
modes of decision-making. Institutional memory from the Yugoslav centralized administration 
subsists with municipal civil servants diminishing their commitment to new models of cooperation 
and including collaboration with other actors (DEMI Interview 2012). In the last decade, many 
municipalities see politically active figures remaining active in local politics and thus exercising their 
influence in various local issues. Mayors often persist in exercising political power within institutions 
thus hindering effective implementation of external initiatives.  
The SIAP model’s shortcoming is its resemblance to existing Municipal Committees. According to the 
Law on Local Self-Government, Municipal Assemblies may establish the Committees on any policy 
area and invite non-state actors to share their expertise on the matter (LLSG 2008).10 Instead of 
functionalizing the structure, DEMI ignored the existing model for coordination as Municipal 
Committees mainly utilize their mandate for oversight of the municipal executive branch. 
Parallel structures in the Northern region present one of the biggest challenges for the project to 
reach out to Serbian-majority municipalities. In 2011, DEMI supported collaboration between 
community leaders and the North Mitrovica Municipal Preparation Team11 to implement a 
community project on cleaning the Ibër/Ibar riverbank. For larger-scale impact, the politically radical 
groupings amongst Kosovo-Serbs and the ever-strong parallel structures in the North were serious 
constraints bringing to a halt one component of the DEMI initiative (Interview 2011). By offering 
proper mechanisms for collaboration between municipalities DEMI intends to bridge these ethnic 
barriers. One example of this are the informative sessions for Serb-majority municipalities held by 
                                                 
10
 Despite AKM and OSCE resources invested in enabling these structures, Municipal Committees have been 
established in a limited number of municipalities and do not function on many policy areas. 
11
 The Municipal Preparation Team (MPT) established by the ICO and the Kosovo government to set-up the 
foundation of a new North Mitrovica municipality, has been in a state of limbo for several years. 
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larger municipalities such as Peja/Pec and Ferizaj/Uroševac offering explanations on administrative 
aspects of municipal functions. 
Conclusion  
In post conflict Kosovo, local government reform and decentralisation present a complex and highly 
contentious policy sphere. The local level has been subject to several structural and political changes 
over the years, depending on its position on the country’s political agenda. International agencies 
played a key role in the reform processes, augmented by a limited statehood environment and weak 
state capacities. Decentralisation policies are highly politicised as they impact political preferences of 
local leaders and ethnic communities. One of the biggest challenges in implementing reforms was the 
refusal of the Serb minority to engage early on in the institutionalised structures and the isolation of 
North Kosovo from overall governance reforms.  
With regard to the case studies, five distinctive elements can be identified from the case studies of 
international engagement in promoting reform at the local level. First, both initiatives focus on the 
executive branch with the aim to strengthen core executives in local administrations. Municipal 
officials maintain a position of highest authority, even if they do exert much leadership potential as 
compared to non-state actors. New structures such as departments, working groups, platforms of 
discussion or partnership units are easily established and promoted as successes. The impact is 
twofold. On one side formal institutions are pressed into new realms of decision-making and 
coordination significantly different from the pre-1999 institutionalised norms. On the other side, it 
may lead to more layers of bureaucracy in an already heavily bureaucratised institutional setting with 
a ‘working group fatigue’.   
Second, case studies emphasize the clear objective of international initiatives to bridge the divide 
between state and non-state institutions by securing horizontal modes of cooperation. Civil society 
organizations and businesses are encouraged to participate in the process of dialogue with municipal 
representatives to embed open processes of decision-making to include non-state actors. 
Third, utilizing features of a market model of governance, the external initiatives incite municipalities 
to compete amongst each other and with private firms. The aim is to enhance efficiency and instil a 
culture of competition for better services. Financial incentives in the form of grant schemes are 
significant components of both external projects. Considering the lack of local resources in 
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municipalities, donor funding proves as a significant incentive for municipal actors to actively engage 
in improving local governance. Particularly, the DEMI initiative, by incorporating several elements 
from previous USAID funded projects on local government, ensures continued interest of 
municipalities and their affirmation of ideas and mechanisms proposed through the project. By 
including financial rewards for municipal projects, both DEMI and EURED initiatives secured broad 
participation of local stakeholders.  
Fourth, the initiatives allocate insufficient attention to intergovernmental relations. Relations 
between local and central government institutions remain underdeveloped and have delayed 
progress in general. Local authorities continue to feel left out of major policies concerning essential 
local issues such as competences, functionality of local administration and local development. The 
frequent change of legislation, programs and activities, caused an omnipresent confusion and 
municipal administrations were too often ‘left to solve their own issues’ (ICO Interview 2011). Any 
attempt to bring new modes of decision-making and advance reciprocal support of institutions must 
incorporate mechanisms to bridge these divides. 
Lastly, the cases illustrate a failure of international agencies in providing clear long-term strategies for 
embedding these new modes of local-decision making in the local life. Incentives delivered from 
international projects substitute for the weak presence of central government authorities. The lack of 
development policies encompassing local development facilitates a strong presence of EURED 
principles and interpretations of governance. In addition, the lack of domestic mechanisms for 
rewarding excellent services offered by municipalities, enables local actors to follow guidelines and 
interpretations of good governance offered by USAID’s DEMI project instead. 
Insight gathered from the case studies informs a series of recommendations for local actors and 
policymakers. The new legal framework on decentralisation offers ample opportunity for local actors 
to strengthen their voice and emphasize their demands to both the central level and international 
agencies. These new conditions must be utilized strategically to fulfil local demands. With the 
presence of international donors, ready to invest in programs and initiatives for enhancing good local 
governance, local authorities should strongly advocate their own agenda and steer donations in 
particular issues which need attention. Accepting any and all donor projects does not lead to direct 
improvement of conditions at the local level but on the contrary burdens the local administration. 
Local authorities should avoid situations in which they accept projects from international agencies 
without careful consideration. 
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The successful implementation and sustainability of external initiatives for reform depends on local 
authorities adopting mechanisms of open decision-making as a new way of doing politics. Local actors 
can strengthen their ownership of the reform process and solidify their commitment to improving 
local governance by cooperating and contributing to such initiatives. More pronounced local 
involvement from the early stages of assistance initiatives would benefit the promotion of local 
reforms through legitimizing these initiatives and ensuring their sustainability once donor funding 
ends. This commitment would also decrease the negative side effects of externally led initiatives and 
ensure the achieved results benefit the local communities. 
A more thorough engagement is also recommended for the central government. Their involvement in 
designing new reform initiatives together with international agencies would ensure that funds and 
technical assistance are directed to the most pressing issues. Furthermore, central government 
authorities should closely monitor the work of donor agencies through enhanced donor coordination 
activities. Closely overseeing this process would strengthen their commitment to reforms and prevent 
redundant projects. This would also protect the interests of domestic actors. Lastly, the central 
government should engage in directing financial assistance to the local level to sustain newly 
established structures especially where such structures are necessary for effective and democratic 
local governance but lack sufficient local resources. 
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